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INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing (CC) changes the way IT architectural solutions are put forward using virtualization. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 1 defined CC as, model for enabling on-demand access to networks, storage, applications, and services [1] . Examples of CC products are Amazon Web Service, Google AppEngine, and Windows Azure. Both small and large organizations benefit from CC in terms of reduced operating costs and increase in business agility [2] . The CC paradigm has attracted the attention of many academic and industrial researchers. European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 2 carried out a study in which CC security was labeled as an important research area [3] .
The key technique behind CC is virtualization. The inherent vulnerabilities of internal network in host and Local Area Network (LAN) pose threat to the VMs when they are live migrated. These security challenges are presented in [4] [5] [6] [7] . It is believed that the VM migration security is an important research area.
Live VM migration is a powerful feature of virtualization. In it the VMM triggers the migration and VM is moved from one physical host to another with little or no delay and without service interruptions [8] . VM migration allows the CPs to do upgrades, workload balancing, consolidation of VMs, testing and etc.
In the Cloud data center, multiple VMs (with guest OS) run concurrently on a physical computer (host) using VMM. The network inside host and the LAN, in which migration is done, is vulnerable to attack just like physical network. This puts the VM guest OS and the applications hosted on it at risk [4] , [9] , [10] . The VM faces vulnerabilities when it migrates from one host to another [11] [12] [13] . VM live migration is susceptible to network attacks such as ARP spoofing, Man-in-the-middle, DoS, DDoS, DNS poisoning and etc. [4] and [11] . As different customers run VMs in same LAN (in which the migration is done) the VM becomes prone to attacks [10] . An inappropriate firewall policy allows an attacker to initiate, control and terminate the migration [13] . A weak or missing policy can help an attacker to initiate migration, insert VM with malicious code, execute rough code on it or crash it. To prevent any unauthorized activity the control policy such as firewall rules must be defined and kept intact all times during migration process [13] .
The authors' state firewalls can enforce security for VM in network [7] , [10] and [14] . They emphasize on firewall intactness during and right after migration to avoid any security loopholes. Computer firewalls have existed since 1980s. A firewall is a security device which enforces security policy using a set of rules. It can be virtual or physical. According to [15] housing multiple VMs into one host eliminates physical/hardware firewall and other traditional security mechanisms. Author explains having virtualization adds a virtual layer in the IT infrastructure in which traditional hardware firewall, intended for physical environments, lacks visibility which adds up to the network vulnerabilities. CEO of Cisco, John Chambers, in 2009 RSA conference highlighted the point that security in Cloud cannot be handled in traditional ways [16] . Hardware firewalls are blind to virtual traffic since it never leaves the host. Hence, the virtual firewalls (VF) are used to secure VMs. VMM-level VF are discussed and implemented by [14] , [15] , [17] , [18] . Source VMM-level VF provides security to VM before the migration incurs and the destination VMM-level VF starts securing VM after migration is completed. It thus, becomes possible for attacker to use the intermediate migrating window to launch attacks. As the Cloud environment is shared, it is possible for an attacker to launch an attack across VMs inside host or in LAN [4] and [19] . In a virtual world the attacks can be more rapid and thus, devastating [17] and [20] .
VFs are a solution to this problem [4] , [14] , [18] , [21] [22] [23] [24] . Virtual firewalling is a firewall service that can perform packet filtering in virtual environments based on IP, ports and protocols [25] . VF policy for controlled communication of VMs can protect VM during migration from unauthorized migration initiation, hijacking, or inserting code into VM [13] .
Having VMM-level VF can have issues. According to [26] , the VMM is the attack surface and must have bare minimum control. There are more than 40 combined vulnerabilities reported in Xen and VMware ESXi in the U.S. government's National Vulnerabilities Database 3 . Work on secure VMM to perform secure migration has also been published [8] . In addition, there could be an unsecure destination VMM or bugs in VMM migration module [13] . Jennifer Rexford suggests involving customer in the migration process as a good practice [27] . Mostly, the CP initiates migration to which the customer is unaware. Moreover, the source VMM-level VF protects VM before migration initiates whereas destination VMM-level VF protects VM after VM migration is under the control of destination host. The intermediate migration path remains unprotected making the VM vulnerable. These add risk to the software and OS residing on VM during migration and until the firewall rules are restored. This is demonstrated in Fig. 1 .
Considering the potential of VFs there should be a great value in using VM-level open source VFs for protecting VMs between start migration and end migration (as in Fig. 2) . Most of the previous work has focused on the implementation of live migration with little or no consideration towards its security intactness while migration. Ones that discuss security mainly cover aspects of VMM-level firewalls. The intactness or activeness of VM-level VF during migration or its empirical evaluation was not researched. VF is considered an important integrated security element in Cloud environments. Having VF on machine would provide security to VM after migration is initiated to when the migration ends, thus, protecting VM from attacks during the transition. It is, however, good to secure VM using VM-level firewall i.e. at user level to provide security to VM during migration. This would also wave-off the total dependency on VMM-level VFs and reduce other associated risks. An accessible solution for this is OpenBSD PFF. In recent years open source VFs have matured and are effective like their commercial counterparts [28] [29] [30] . PFF amongst other open source VFs provides richer security features [31] . Hence, it would be advantageous to experiment and validate the use of PFF at VM-level for migrating VM as a complement to enhance its security during VM transition. With PFF at VM-level the attack window for attacker during migration span can be reduced. The results of this study can be useful for the Cloud providers (CPs) and customers. Having VM-level firewall would build security layer for customer. If all customers have this layer, the security of overall data center would also be enhanced, thus, benefitting CP in the long run.
A. Problem Definition
In CC the virtualization technology leverages running many VMs on a single physical host. The VMs are live migrated to other hosts by CPs for load balancing, maintenance, and etc. VM is exploitable during migration. During migration the intruder in network can stop migration, manipulate data on VM or hijack it [4] , [7] , [11] . If an intruder is successful to gain access to VM during transition, the OS and data on VM is exposed. This propagates the threat to its host and other hosts in LAN. VFs, which are regarded as first line of security in network, are used to secure the VMs when they migrate [14] , [32] . These protect the VM from virtual network and LAN threats using firewall rules to control the VM communication.
VFs can be at VMM-level or VM-level. The VMM-level VFs, if employed, protects VM before and after migration. Different VF solutions are available in industry that takes care of VM migration security at VMM-level. Fig. 2 to compare the VMM-level and VM-level VFs for VM migration security. The VMM-level firewalls protect the VM from network threats before and after migration [7] , [13] . During the migration the attacker anywhere in network can exploit the VM [4] , [11] . The VM-level firewall would enable security of VM during migration.
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To evaluate the intactness of VM-level VF the Total Migration Time (TMT) and VM downtime (DT) is calculated. The difference of both would indicate the uptime (UT) of VMlevel VF during VM mobility.
TMT is the duration between when migration is initiated and when the migration is completed. The DT during migration is when the VM is unresponsive. DT is a slot anywhere during TMT and according to literature it's always less than TMT [33] . Hence, the time during which migration is happening but VM is not down could potentially be used by attacker to attack VM, which is where the VF can provide security to VM. This time is referred as VF uptime (UT). It is calculated by subtracting DT from TMT. This study performs VF implementation at VM-level and evaluates the UT of VF. 
B. Research Question
Having known the context of VFs in VM migration in CC the research question is: Does VF at VM-level protect the VM during migration and what is its empirical evaluation?
C. Aims & Objectives
The aim is to investigate the VM-level virtual firewalling solution as a complementary security layer for securing the migrating VM in CC domain. The objectives are as follows:
• Propose virtual firewalling at VM-level using open source VF.
• Implement VM-level VF to validate its intactness (uptime) during migration.
• Validate and evaluate the VM-level VF in real Cloud data center environment.
The following sections are organized as follows: Section II comprises of the related work on virtual firewalls for VM migration security. Section III describes the research methodology. Section IV presents the validity threats. Section V shows results of research. Section VI contains the discussion on the gathered results. Section VII finishes off the research with concluding remarks and potential pointers for future work.
II. RELATED WORK

A. System Virtualization
Virtualization is a staple technology of CC. IBM pioneered it in 1960s [34] to utilize the resources of mainframe computers with timesharing and multiprogramming techniques. These techniques led to the conception of virtualization. Virtualization is defined as the abstraction of hardware resources for enabling resource sharing. It can be at different levels: application, desktop, network, storage and system virtualization [5] . These resources can be dynamically provisioned to the users on demand via Internet. With virtualization benefits comes the need for virtual security [5] , [15] and [35] . System virtualization is when a single physical host runs a number of VMs on it. This VM has its own applications that run on its OS (guest OS). For the user, a VM behaves just like an independent physical machine. A Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) interconnects the VMs, manages them and emulates the underlying hardware for VM [5] . Examples of VMMs are VMware ESXi 4 and KVM
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. For emulation, environment such as QEMU can be used. The system virtualization architecture (taken from [5] ) is shown in Fig. 3 .
B. Related Work
A closely related literature to this study is [14] , in which the authors present the need for virtualizing security functions that are currently in the form of hardware appliances, such as firewalls. They demonstrated that VMware vShield VF secures VM and helps to achieve secure migration with coordination of vMotion protocol. For secure migration the vShield VF should be installed on every VM and the vShield manager should be available at all times. The vSheild manager would send firewall rules to every vShield VF before executing migration to maintain protection. It runs on the commercial security vulnerability appliance of VMware only. A design approach and prototype implementation of an extension of the virtual network (ViNe) system is presented in [36] to support live migration of VMs. ViNe established tunnels between Cloud infrastructures which doesn't interrupt the network traffic. The researcher executed migrations in which both the source and destination VMMs should have ViNe to support the migration process. Moreover, the evaluation of the approach was not presented.
Reference [37] imitated network device called VSFilter which performed virtual firewalling to filter network packets. However, it did not talk about VF behavior during migration. A network virtualization solution is presented in [38] that provided WAN VM live migration without disturbing the network connections. They do not specifically talk about firewall rules. Reference [9] recommended isolating the network traffic between VMs housed on same host using a VMM-based firewall. Other literature on VMM-level firewall includes [4] , [18] , [24] .
The above mentioned literature advocated use of a VMMbased firewall for securing a VM during migration. A related work that acknowledges VM-level security is given in [10] . The authors introduce a framework for moving firewall context of VM with VM. They base the migration for LAN environments and using shared file system like in this study. However, they neither evaluate their work nor refer to firewall rule behavior during migration. Reference [8] also acknowledged this issue of migrating firewall states, and modified the XEN live migration tool for providing connection tracking at VMM-level. However, none implemented VF at VM-level, nor discussed its intactness during migration and neither performed empirical tests for VF resiliency during VM motion.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study is based on the systematic literature review (SLR) on virtual firewalling for VM migration security done by Mahwish Anwar. The SLR strategy, choice of resources, study selection process and evaluation using Quasi-gold sensitivity has been comprehensively covered by Mahwish Anwar in her Thesis on the subject in 2013 [39] .
Out of the selected studies a trend was seen of having VMM-level firewall security to protect VMs while migration. Moreover, the papers that covered some sort of virtual firewalling were either not evaluated or dealt with commercial solutions. Thirdly, these results did not evaluate the intactness or behavior of VF during migration.
In this study open source VF is implemented on VM to identify potential of having VF on VM during migration. This is done by measuring firewall behavior or intactness during migration. As it's not possible to test firewall rule during small migration time, hence, the uptime (UT) of VF is calculated. UT denotes that firewall is active and is providing security to VM during migration span. An experimental validation in real Cloud setup is performed to evaluate the VF intactness during migration.
A. Experimental Design
To design the experiment the available resources were taken into consideration which included the accessible resources at the City Network. In the next step the VF was configured on VM to verify the VF rules before, during and after migration. A pilot migration was performed to verify rule behavior during migration. To understand to what extent the experimental results are valid, the migration expert at City Network performed 8 VM migrations. However, firewall evaluation is critical in case of live VM migrations, hence, the UT is calculated. It is measured using difference of TMT and DT [40] . The difference in both durations shows the potential of VF in securing VM from network attacks during migration. The following sections describe these steps in detail.
Before using VM-level PFF in real Cloud environment, it is important to investigate whether the VF rules remain intact during migration or not. In addition to this the uptime of VF during migration is evaluated to estimate the potential of using VM-level VF. The uptime (UT) is calculated using the difference of Total Migration Time (TMT) and downtime (DT). UT = TMT -D. Both TMT and DT are critical metrics for evaluating VM migration. These are used in the experiment to evaluate the intactness of VF during migration as no other metric to evaluate VF behavior during migration is provided by CP, who conducts migration, nor its given by VF vendor [33] .
TMT is the duration between when migration is initiated and when the migration is completed [12] . TMT ranges between 21 s to 250 s according to [8] and [33] . The DT during migration is when the VM is unresponsive. VM downtime varies between 0.3 s to 14 s according to [8] and [33] . DT is a slot anywhere during TMT and according to literature it's always less than TMT [33] . Hence, the time during which migration is happening but VM is not down could potentially be used by attacker to attack VM, which is where the VF can provide security to VM. This time is referred as VF uptime (UT). It is calculated by subtracting DT from TMT. Hence, UT for VF is calculated by sending ICMP packets continuously to the migrating VM. The machine has firewall policy that allows the ICMP packet transmission. The firewall log files are analyzed to calculate TMT and DT [33] , [40] .
Both TMT and DT are measured using ping commands. Similar approach was used in Fang Hao's study to estimate DT [40] . The ping requests were directed to the target VM from remote VM after every 0.5 second and 0.01 second intervals (I). The choice of decreasing the interval was to get more precise results. To find out TMT 2 different formulas we used for different ping intervals. For I = 0.5 s, TMT = PS/2 and for I = 0.01 s, TMT = PS/100; where, PS is total number of ping packets sent by remote VM from start of migration till when the migration was completed and I is the ping interval. The formula for calculating downtime is: DT = PL*I; where, PL denotes the number of lost pings and I is the ping interval [33] .
In order to achieve the general results in experiments they should be conducted in real environments with actual people who are going to benefit from it or use it [41] . However, as VMs are owned by customer, hence, the experiment was conducted in real setup by renting VMs from City Network. The diagrammatic representation of the setup is in Fig. 5 and 6 . However, the intervention of migration expert at City Network was done to perform the migration.
To design the experiment the population is to be identified [41] . The population consists of PFF rules. An organization's security policy can contain up to hundreds of rules. It is difficult to use all possible rules in experiment so a sample of rules is taken. After this the sampling procedure is identified. The important factors to consider in sampling are the sampling frame, method and the sample size. The sampling frame contains all members of the population that have the probability to be present in a sample and must be demonstrative of their population. In this thesis the sampling frame consisted of 14 VF rules (strata 1 & 2). Reference [42] formed a set of 7 unique firewall rules (strata 1) based on the generalization algorithm that showed all possible relations between all terms of the rule (Action, Protocol, Source Port, Destination Port, Source IP, Destination IP). The addition of 5 default rules and 2 rules to allow ping was done to the sample (strata 2). The final sample consisted of 14 rules. Due to the movement of Internet packets to and from VM at any given time, it is expected that at any given time the VM migration can be performed. Therefore, 8 migrations are performed in a row 6 and used as the sample frame. The actual migration was scheduled in week before; due to technical issues the validation schedule was revised. 8 migrations, 4 migrations for each ping interval, were performed to wave off any validity threat of performing the experiment one time. For choosing a sampling method, it is essential to elect if probability sampling method is suitable or not. In it, all members of the population have the chance to be chosen in the sample. If members have the same probability to be selected, the sample can be unbiased. Here, it is possible to perform a random sampling with equal probabilities. Hence, the rules for a VM can be selected at random. Firewall rules (for IPs, ports and interfaces) between 2 VMs in both to and from direction were selected.
All records are selected using stratification i.e. complete strata 1 and 2. This means no rule selection was done from each stratum but rather entire strata were chosen. In this way, the sample can be said to have fairer representation of population. The sample rule-set is shown in Fig. 4 . 
B. Experimental Implementation
To illustrate the potential of VM-level VF to protect the migrating VM, an implementation of open source PFF is done on VM. The implementation setup and choice of resources included the accessible resources at City Network. The implementation network consisted of physical hosts connected to Internet through switch as in Fig. 5 . The hosts are connected to external storage and to other hosts using dedicated VLAN. Each host housed multiple VMs. The migration is executed on open source Kernel-based virtual machine monitor (KVM) residing on host computer using standard KVM migration algorithm. QEMU 7 (Quick emulator) is used to emulate hardware such as physical NIC for user. QEMU is accessed from Internet using Login name and password. Through successful Login user can access OS and data on VM. The block diagram for migration setup is shown in Fig. 6 . Appliances ranging from Linux flavors to Windows were available with hardware going from 1 CPU to 8 CPUs and varying memory choices from 10GB to 3000GB. To limit the scope of study VMs were prepared with similar specifications as in TABLE 1. No migration optimization tools were used. The migration was performed using standard KVM migration. The implementation of set-up required:
• Setting up 2 VMs (remote, target).
• Configuring PFF policy on VMs.
o Remote VM with policy that accepts all incoming and outgoing traffic. o Target VM with PFF sample rule-set that includes rules specified with IP, ports, interfaces and protocols; TCP, UDP, ICMP.
• Rules are logged for analysis.
• The VMM triggers the migration.
C. Experimental Validation
After setting up VMs the VF was configured and loaded. The communication between 2 VMs was verified to see if the PFF rules function like they should. This was done before migration.
A session was setup with the migration expert. It was decided to perform live VM migrations to verify the valid functionality of the firewall rules during and after migration and to evaluate the intactness of VF using UT. The validation process was executed in Karlskrona, Sweden during 1500 hours from City Network.
During each migration, the ping (ICMP) requests were sent and logged on remote system. The log file was also maintained on target VM to verify PFF behavior during migration. The reason to log packets on remote host has 2 reasons. One is to generate TCPDUMP on target VM to verify PFF functionality during migration. Second is to analyze the logs for missing ping packets for UT calculation. The log file on remote system captured target VM's IP, packet sequence number and time in milliseconds the packet took to get response from target VM.
For evaluation of PFF intactness the log on remote VM was analyzed to see total sent packets (for TMT) and missing packets (for DT). To validate PFF rule functionality after migration the rules were tested again on target VM. To have general results in total 8 migrations were done. The TMT and DT for migration were recorded for all VMs using the formulas. UT was calculated using formula. UT demonstrated the intactness of VF during migration, thus, showing the potential of VM-level VF during migration. The results are shown in TABLE 2. A pilot test was run to check if rules were functioning as desired. Test migration was performed as well to verify the PFF functionality before and after migration. After validation the data is recorded into Excel sheet. The following fields were recorded: VM ID, VM IP, VM OS, VM memory, VM CPU, host hardware, host CPU, VMM specification, VM rule set, VM rule-set functionality, ping packets send, ping packets received and ping sequence number. The system logs were stored in VMs (.txt and .cap format). It is useful to test each rule during migration but as migration slot is small enough to test all rules, only one was tested as shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . If one rule was intact during migration it was assumed other rule for that specific run will also be intact.
D. Experiment Verification
To ensure that PFF rule-set functions as it should, the PFF was configured and tested between 2 VMs. The testing was done during preliminary test and also while doing validation. First, default rules were configured on PFF and their functionality verified. Then the individual rules of strata were tested separately. This was done because PFF matches the rules from top to bottom and fires the last matching rule. Doing separate verification for each rule ensured that rule was configured and loaded correctly. Then, all sample rules were loaded and functionality verified. Before the migration the IPs, VM IDs, and other data was recorded. All VMs were prepared for migration together. Each migration was done separately i.e. one VM was migrated at one time. Ping request was sent while VM transition from remote VM to target VM. Logs were maintained at remote VM. The process was repeated for all migrations to find out behavior of VF during VM motion.
Lastly, the UT is calculated using TMT and DT difference and rules were verified again after VM migration.
Before commencing the validation process, migration expert at City Network tested the KVM migration.
IV. VALIDITY THREATS
The study faced several validity threats that threat the results and so must be catered before evaluating the use and validation of PFF in Cloud environment. Construct validity occurs when inadequate measures of variables are used [40] . The design and reliability of experiment can have construct threat to the results. Results can be hampered with semantic error in firewall rule or incomplete packet transmission on network. To weaken the effect of the threat, rules published elsewhere were chosen for experimenting. Fig. 4 shows how PFF configuration looked like. Further, ping interval was decreased to 0.01 seconds which means 100 packets were sent to target VM over network each second. It was done to send and capture many packets within a second to get more accurate number of missing packets which would result in precise and possibly near to actual uptime. This also potentially waved off the threat of using a simple network diagnostic tool, Ping. Making the interval smaller, more accuracy can be expected. Also to test the functionality of rule they were tested prior to running the actual migration experiment. The results of ping logs are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 .
Other validity threats that can question the experiment's evaluation and validation are internal and external validity threats [43] . Internal validity mirrors that the study's casual conclusion is justified. Such merit is founded by the extent to which the study reduces its bias. The external validity threat refers to wrong inference from the sample. The threat to these validities may occur if the PFF rules that are used in the evaluation are not representative of the population i.e. are biased in terms of size and rule functionality. If nonrepresentative rules are chosen the result can be naive. To cater it, the stratified samples are used from population for the experiment. Both strata are included so all rule combinations can be included. Entire strata (strata 1 + strata 2) were chosen for experimental validation to make it representative of the population. Furthermore, to reduce external validity threat on results due to any network latency or any other unknown factor the migrations were done 8 times along with statistical analysis; standard deviation and confidence interval. However, it is considered to replicate the study at later times with more number of migrations to determine if the same results occur.
V. Experiment Validation and Evaluation Results
Does VF at VM-level protect the VM during migration and what is its empirical evaluation?
The results of the 8 live migrations are gathered with the help of migration expert at City Network. To view the firewall rule intactness during migration ICMP (ping) packets were sent from a remote system to target VM while it was in transition. The ping requests were logged in file on the remote machine to capture number of ICMP packets that were missed. The firewall rule is configured on target machine to pass in and out the ping requests. TABLE 2 depicts the total number of ICMP requests sent and replies received for each VM which was used to measure downtime and approximate TMT of VM. VM downtime is assumed to be equal to VF downtime. On subtracting VF DT from TMT, the active/up time for VF can be measured. Here Uptime (for I = 0.01 s) varies from 93 % to 99%. In other words it means that for up to 99% of migration span the VF at VM-level was found to be blocking and allowing packets i.e. it was intact, Fig. 9 . When the ping interval was set to half of a second, the ICMP requests were sent 2 times in each second. As the number of packets loss is always a whole number, the downtime value will always be a whole number or nearest to 0.5. To get more precise results the ping interval was decreased to a 100th part of a second i.e. 100 ping requests were sent per second. This allowed to send and to capture more packets per second which resulted in more tuned value of packets lost per second as in TABLE 2. Having decreased the interval gave mean downtime equal to 0.47s, as compared to 0.75s with large interval. TABLE 2 shows mean, standard deviation and confidence interval for DT, TMT and UT. The standard deviation enables to depict which VMs have their UT within a standard deviation of mean. It shows that 87% of the values are within a standard deviation of a mean and can be classified as normal i.e. most of the VMs have normal uptime.
With 5% risk of being wrong (95% confidence) the UT of machines varied between 8 s and 24 s, with mean UT 16.25 s (for Ping Interval 0.01 s). It can be said that if VF is implemented on VM, 97% of the migration interval has active firewall protection (here mean TMT is 16.6 s). Having 97% protection of migration slot, reduces attacker's chances to gain access to VM. This is presented in Fig. 9 .
To test if of PF rules were intact during transition, TCPDUMP logs were captured on target VM. However, the PPF rules were also tested after migration to verify the functionality of the rule and were found to be correctly configured. In Fig. 7 on 19th minute 20th second and 22nd second, 4 ICMP requests and responses were logged. The ping interval is 0.5 seconds, in this case. On 19th minute at 21st second target VM (91.123.201.8) received a packet request. 2 packets are missing in the logs. 
VI. DISCUSSION
Making use of VF at VM-level will help the VM customers to enhance the VM security during migration. Thus, by using technology at their own disposal it's possible to create securer environment for VM migrations. In the literature review [39] majority of studies relied on improving VMM-level security for secure VM migration or used commercial VFs at VM-level. None measured VF activeness during migration. They also lacked investigation on using open source virtual firewalling solution at VM-level. Therefore, in this study VF is implemented at VM-level with help of data center experts to research on the prospective of VF such as OpenBSD PFF at VM-level as a complement to the other available firewalls in virtual set-up. Also uptime is calculated to evaluate its activeness, thus, filling up research gap. The behavior of VF is evaluated and validated using an experiment which depicted mean uptime of 16.2 s (for I= 0.01s). The migration expert evaluated the validity of the results in real data center. Knowing the fact that no optimization was used to perform virtual firewalling or for migration, the downtime was found close to VMware's product (0.4s approximately) [33] which shows the validity of open source virtual firewalling at VM-level. In [33] VMware analysis of downtime is done for 4GB machine with working set equal to 0MB. As target machine was idle, we assume the working set was close to 0MB. It is assumed, as VF DT is close to VMware's, the UT calculation would also be close to other products in industry.
Additionally, no studies reported empirical evaluation of VF such as PFF during VM migration at VM-level in CC which refers to the research gap in the research industry.
However, the diagnostic network tool Ping used for calculation of uptime may not be a best choice for evaluating critical live migration process. It is considered to run similar experiment using other available network statistic tool.
Although the PFF rules used as experiment sample are taken from a research paper [42] , using more terms in rule may alter the results. While performing rule configuration, it is however, critical for administrator to have firewalling knowledge. PFF, although provide tightened security, but in case of false or incomplete rule the firewall can produce incorrect behavior. Often misconfiguration leads to administrators' lack of motivation. To cater this, the idea is to marry use of VMM-level firewalling, to add up a security layer preventing VMs from disastrous attacks. However, for expert user, this may not hold true. With this, PF provides logging feature at a very grain level so getting additional data can be useful, for security professionals, which can be utilized to detect intrusion attempts and attack patterns.
Having VM-level VF resolves other issues such as dependency on Cloud provider to maintain fine grained VM security. As VMM is more prone to attacks than VM, hence, the security mechanism on VM naturally keeps VM safer than having security only on VMM.
In small companies and businesses where budget is not too high for security, using this approach for VM security during migrations can leverage the owner from licensing cost and upgradation costs of using commercial services. Moreover, when it comes to secure OS, OpenBSD tops up. Even, in terms of firewalling features and security perspective OpenBSD PFF holds good repute.
Third party can provide firewall-as-a-service for CC users and manage firewall for customers who do not have the resources to manage it themselves for example complex security policies.
VII. FUTURE WORK
This research looked into the potential of virtual firewalling at VM-level using open source Packet filter firewall as an additional security layer for migrating virtual machine's (VM). Based on literary review [39] , the design was set-up and firewalling done for VM. To test its functionality and uptime an experiment with the help of migration expert was executed. The firewall was found to be intact during migration process with mean uptime of 16.25 s (I = 0.01s). The reason for change in uptime is not a part of this research.
The validity of the results was examined with the help of the data center migration expert from City Network, Sweden. The validation process showed that the 75% of the uptime values were normal uptime ranges (in this scenario). Additionally, a potential research area was found during the validation process. Although, the VMs were not under heavy workload, even then, some had more round trip ping time. It can be looked in future, the reasons which caused the round trip time to vary greatly. Also, it was found that the maximum round time occurred before packet loss in some cases. The study highlighted the understanding of using VM-level open source VF for VM migration security and VM security in general as a supplement to the VMM-level firewalling in CC. It is concluded that using such an approach will likely bring improved security for VMs like an additional security perimeter layer on the network and providing customized and deep security.
It is however, essential to perform a similar experiment using more sophisticated network diagnostic tools. To overcome the shortcomings of having 8 migrations, another similar study with more migrations can further validate its results. It's also beneficial to use PFF with full security features and test in real environment for days to verify its resiliency. In the research, the migration was done in LAN. It can open doors to a common gate for doing secure WAN migrations; hence, looking into WAN migrations in future can be a yielding prospect. There are other virtual security appliances that can leverage VM security and security of virtualization architecture on the whole. The rules used to perform experiment were simple i.e. either had port blocking or protocol. Adding NAT, Pfsync, CARP and etc. can be useful in dynamic CC set-up. To improve PFF performance PF optimizer of OpenBSD can be employed, to optimize rule matching.
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